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Comments
ALLELUIA, THE BUCK STOPS HERE: THE
PARAMETERS OF INDIVIDUAL PROTECTED
CONCERTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACTt
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the right
of employees to engage in concerted activity. Concerted activity is
often considered as group activity such as union picketing or orga-
nizational drives. The scope of section 7 is much broader, how-
ever. Individual activity is included within the concept of con-
certed activity, although the extent to which individual action is
protected is in dispute. In particular, whether an employee who
exercises an independent statutory right is protected under section
7 is a common subject of debate. This comment argues that an
employee who individually invokes an employment-related statu-
tory right is unprotected under the Act because such action is not
within the scope of the Act's legislative purpose.
INTRODUCTION
Fixing the permissible boundaries of individual activity in the
workplace is a point of contention between employees and employers.
Over the years the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)' has
t The author wishes to thank his parents for their invaluable help and support in
the preparation of this article.
1. National Labor Relations Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982). The NLRB has
two main functions: (1) to conduct representation elections and certify the results and (2)
to prevent employers or unions from engaging in unfair labor practices.
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defined what it believes to be the parameters of individual activity
through its decisions and orders. While these decisions have been ap-
plied uniformly in subsequent cases before the NLRB, their applica-
bility in an appellate court depends upon the federal circuit in which
an appeal of an NLRB decision takes place.
As a result of circuit courts individually affirming or rejecting
NLRB decisions, the law regarding individual employee activity var-
ies among circuits. When a conflict exists among the circuits on a
point of law, the U.S. Supreme Court may resolve the conflict so
that uniformity of the law will exist. Recently, the Supreme Court
decided NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc.2 which dealt with the
right of an individual employee to enforce a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement. This was an issue of great disagreement
among the circuits. In its opinion, the Court took an expansive view
of the bounds of individual employee activity by holding that an em-
ployee who individually asserts a right grounded in a collective bar-
gaining agreement is protected from discharge.
The careful observer will realize that the Court's decision created
an apparent inconsistency in individual employee rights as a result of
an earlier decision this year by the NLRB. In Meyers Industries3
the NLRB held that where a group of employees are not unionized
and there is no collective bargaining agreement, an employee's asser-
tion of a right that can only be presumed to be of interest to other
employees is not protected from employer retribution. The effect of
this inconsistency can be seen in the following hypothetical situation.
An employee is instructed by his employer to drive a particular
truck. While leaving the parking lot, he discovers the truck's brakes
are faulty. He parks the vehicle and informs the employer he will not
drive an unsafe truck. The employer orders him to drive the truck or
look for another job. The driver refuses, claiming that the collective
bargaining agreement in force guarantees employees the right to re-
fuse to handle equipment they believe is unsafe. As a result, the em-
ployer fires the employee.
In a similar situation, a nonunion employee without a collective
bargaining agreement, refuses to drive a truck with faulty brakes.
He complains to the employer and files a complaint with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission4 and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration.5 Both agencies cite the employer for various
2. 52 U.S.L.W. 4360 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
3. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (Jan. 6, 1984).
4. 49 U.S.C. § 10301 (1982). The Interstate Commerce Commission is charged
with creating and enforcing regulations regarding the free and safe flow of interstate
commerce.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
is charged with creating and enforcing regulations regarding health and safety in the
workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
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violations. Thereafter, the employer fires the employee.
Both employees .then file an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB' claiming they were discharged for engaging in concerted ac-
tivities protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) .7 After an administrative hearing, the NLRB finds the un-
ionized employee had engaged in a protected concerted activity while
the nonunion employee had not. Accordingly, the NLRB orders that
the unionized employee be reinstated with back pay but upholds the
discharge of the nonunion employee.
The union employee acted properly by enforcing the collective
bargaining agreement which the employer had agreed to follow.
However, the nonunion employee acted just as properly by reporting
the employer for violating legislation which represents a public inter-
est in safe working conditions. Unlike the union employee who only
enforced a contract right, this employee enforced a congressional
mandate to employers requiring safe working conditions. One would
think that such individual action is protected against employer retri-
bution, but the NLRB, following the standards established by City
Disposal Systems and Meyers, denied reinstatement of the em-
ployee. Why was this employee unprotected under the Act?
The answer is found in the type of activities protected under the
Act. Generally, concerted activities are protected under the Act.
However, what is "concerted activity" has generated extensive de-
bate over the years, especially when individual activities are
involved.
This Comment examines the different categories of concerted ac-
tivity, the dispute over the extent to which an individual may engage
in concerted activity, recent developments regarding the scope of in-
dividual concerted activity, and the current status of the law. The
basic premise of this Comment is that an employee, union or nonun-
ion, who individually invokes an employment-related statutory right
does not thereby engage in protected concerted activity under the
Act.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "
SECTION 7 AND CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
Scope of Section 7 Rights
Section 7 represents part of the legislative effort to remedy the
common law prohibitions on the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively with their employer over wages, hours, and
working conditions. Many courts regarded group activity aimed to-
ward improving wages and working conditions as unlawful criminal
conspiracies. Later, such activity was regarded as a civil wrong sub-
ject to injunction. Many employers even successfully invoked the
Sherman Antitrust Act' against groups of employees by claiming
such group organization represented a conspiracy to restrain trade.'
Through the enactment of the Clayton Act,10 the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act," the Railway Labor Act, 2 and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,' 3 Congress attempted to remedy the prior judicial re-
straints on the ability of organized labor to organize by protecting
the right of employees to engage in group activity.' 4 Section 7 is one
aspect of the National Labor Relations Act that protects the right of
employees to engage in concerted activities.' 5 This section covers two
main areas. First, it provides employees the right to aid a labor or-
ganization or to have such represent them; and second, it gives em-
ployees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
The term "concerted activities" embraces activities of employees
joined together to achieve common goals.'6 However, an individual
may engage in activities that are concerted. To be protected by sec-
tion 7, employees, union or nonunion, must act together for the pur-
pose of mutual aid or protection and not necessarily on behalf of or
through their unions. 17 Mutual activity focuses on improving work-
ing conditions'8 and includes activities such as employees presenting
8. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
9. For a more thorough discussion of the history of labor law and concerted
activity see R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW (1976).
10. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
and 29 U.S.C.).
11. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-
15 (1982)).
12. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63
(1982)).
13. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1982)).
14. R. GORMAN, supra note 9.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
16. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360, 4362 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1984).
17. Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967).
18. Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of 'Concert' Under
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grievances to their employer to secure better working conditions.'9
An employee's personal complaint is treated as individual activity
rather than concerted activity and is unprotected under the Act.20 A
personal complaint is one in which the person's objective is to vent a
personal grievance, or one which is motivated by malice. In a per-
sonal complaint situation, the individual's activity is unrelated to col-
lective bargaining or mutual aid or protection of fellow employees.2'
Employees who voice dissatisfaction about matters of common
concern but who, in good faith, spread information which later
proves to be inaccurate do not lose the Act's protection.22 However,
dissemination of deliberately and maliciously false information is not
protected.23 Unprotected activities include cases where an individual
employee acts only to advance a personal interest,24 favorable resolu-
tion of the employee's complaint will not improve other employees'
working conditions,2 5 and the actions involved are unlawful, violent,
in breach of contract, or indefensibly disloyal.26
Categories of Concerted Activity
Over the years the NLRB and the courts have attempted to delin-
eate the type of actions which constitute concerted activity. Upon
examining their decisions regarding employee activity, two catego-
ries of concerted activity become apparent: group activity and indi-
vidual activity. In the area of individual activity four standards exist:
the "Representation" standard, the Mushroom27 standard, the In-
terboro28 standard, and the Alleluia29 standard. This section exam-
ines what activity falls within these different categories of concerted
activity.
the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 289 n.10 (1981) (quoting
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-568 (1978)).
19. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir. 1969) (quot-
ing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)).
20. ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
21. Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949).
22. Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1968).
23. Id.
24. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 18, at 293.
25. Id.
26. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 136 (C. Morris ed. 1983).
27. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); see also
infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
28. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967); see
also infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
29. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1976); see also infra notes
58-66 and accompanying text.
Group Activity
Actions by a group of employees are most commonly associated
with concerted activity. Most peaceful activities engaged in by a
group of employees exercising section 7 rights are regarded as con-
certed. 30 Group activity regarded as concerted includes collective
bargaining, peaceful economic strikes, sympathy strikes, and dissi-
dent activity in opposition to union leadership. 31
Individual Concerted Activity
As noted, four standards define individual concerted activity: (1)
the "Representation" standard, (2) the Mushroom standard, (3) the
Interboro standard, and (4) the Alleluia standard. The first two
standards enjoy judicial acceptance because they are regarded as a
part of group activity or as a basis for group activity. The latter two
standards are not so widely accepted since each involves a finding of
implied, or constructive, concerted activity and thus both are viewed
as unmerited extensions of coverage under the Act. An understand-
ing of these four standards is essential to understanding the positions
adopted as to each. Accordingly, a summary of each standard
follows.
"'Representation" Standard
Under the "Representation" standard, the employee acts as a rep-
resentative of fellow employees; an individual claim or complaint
must be made on behalf of other employees to be concerted activity.
A claim made solely on behalf of oneself is not concerted activity
and is thus unprotected. 32
An employee acting as a representative need not be appointed a
representative for the complaint to be protected. The spokesperson
may be either a volunteer or a chosen representative. 33 Nor is a
strong showing of organized group activity required. If a reasonable
inference can be drawn from the facts and circumstances that the
employees involved felt they had a grievance, then concerted activity
exists. 34
30. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 26, at 136.
31. Id.
32. ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979).
33. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1355 (3d Cir. 1969).
34. NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop. Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir.
1960). This case provides a good example of concerted activity under the "Representa-
tion" standard. A group of employees complained among themselves about their em-
ployer's failure to promote one of them to a foreman's position. The complaint to the
employer by one of the employees about this matter was considered concerted activity
under the Act.
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Mushroom Standard
Individual activity will be concerted if the objective is to induce or
prepare for group activity or if the activity relates to group activity
in the interest of the employees. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
established this principle in Mushroom Transportation Company v.
NLRB.35 In Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. NLRB, 36 the employer re-
fused to allow an employee to drive a fellow worker home after that
worker received notice of his wife's death. One employee subse-
quently circulated a petition protesting the employer's action. The
employer discharged the employee for circulating the petition. In its
decision, the court relied on Mushroom and stated that individual
activity intended to gain the support and aid of other employees to
correct what they believed were inadequate working conditions was
protected concerted activity.37
The Mushroom Standard is less limiting than the "Representa-
tion" standard. Under the "Representation" standard, there must be
actual group activity represented by the individual's actions. Under
Mushroom, on the other hand, there is no requirement of actual
group activity. While an individual's preliminary discussions with
other employees may not result in group activity, such individual ac-
tion will qualify as concerted activity.38
Almost any concerted activity for mutual aid or protection must
start with communication between individuals.39 Denying protection
simply because no actual group activity results would practically
nullify the right of self organization and collective bargaining guar-
anteed in section 7.1o However, conversation with no apparent inten-
tion, contemplation, or reference to group action falls outside the
Mushroom standard.'
Mere talk must have group action as its objective in order to be
35. 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). In Mushroom, an individual employee
advised fellow employees of their rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Addi-
tionally, it was rumored that he intended to report the company's violations to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. Subsequently, the company alleged he was a trouble
maker and discharged him; however, the employee claimed he was fired for engaging in
concerted activities. In upholding the discharge, the court created the standard for indi-
vidual concerted activity. The court found that none of the evidence showed the employee
intended to induce or promote group activity.
36. 407 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1968).
37. Id. at 1365.




protected. The court in Mushroom emphasized this point when it
said that conversation between employees constitutes concerted ac-
tivity when the speaker acts with the goal of inducing group activity
or when the conversation has some relation to group action in the
interest of employees.42 Mushroom enjoys wide acceptance among
the circuit courts since it is a logical extension of group activity
which is most commonly associated with concerted activity.43
The Theory of Constructive Concerted Activity
Two less accepted theories of individual concerted activity rest
upon a concept developed by the NLRB known as "constructive con-
certed activity." A few circuits have accepted part of this idea 44
while others reject it completely.45
Professors Gorman and Finkin describe the theory as a concept
based upon fictions and fabricated presumptions.46 As they explain
it, an individual's complaint is regarded as made on behalf of a
group when resolution of the grievance inures to the benefit of the
group. All employees benefit when an individual asserts a claim
which is linked to a collective bargaining agreement. In addition, in
the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, there is a presump-
tion of a group benefit from individual claims based on any statute
or public regulation.4
The two constructive concerted activity standards are the In-
terboro standard and the Alleluia standard. By means of these two
standards, the NLRB has granted protected concerted status to the
majority of individual complaints about working conditions.48
42. Id.
43. See Scooba Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam); Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Mush-
room); Wheeling v. Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Sencore, Inc.,
558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc.,
481 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1973); Randolph Div., Eathan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513
F.2d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357,
1365 (4th Cir. 1968); Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967).
44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 459 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v,
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
45. See, e.g., Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
U.S. 1390 (1981); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1980); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet
Co., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977); Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th
Cir. 1967).
46. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 18, at 309.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Interboro Standard
Under the Interboro standard, attempts by an individual to en-
force a collective bargaining agreement provision may be deemed
concerted even in the absence of interest by fellow employees. 49 In
NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.5" two employees individually
complained about collective bargaining agreement violations to their
employer who subsequently discharged them. The NLRB found the
dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice and in so finding cre-
ated the Interboro doctrine.5'
The Second Circuit, in approving the concept, stated that the
NLRB need not find the employee's complaint meritorious for the
activity to be concerted; the employee must only act in good faith.52
The Seventh Circuit is the only other circuit to adopt and apply
the Interboro standard.53 In NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corporation,54 an
employee was to receive a $75.00 wage increase. When he received
only $21.00, he asked the employer whether there had been a payoff
between the union and the employer. The employer fired him for the
statement. The NLRB held that, under Interboro, the discharge was
an unfair labor practice.55 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted
the Interboro doctrine, stating that an attempt by an individual em-
ployee to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, as
that employee reasonably understood those terms to be, is a pro-
tected concerted activity. 56
Concerted activity under Interboro constructively occurs when an
individual bases his right or refusal to act upon a collective bargain-
ing agreement provision. For example, an employee who refuses to
drive a truck based upon a good faith belief it is unsafe is protected
under Interboro if the collective bargaining agreement guarantees a
right to refuse to handle unsafe equipment. 57
49. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
50. 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
51. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966).
52. 388 F.2d at 500.
53. Courts rejecting Interboro include Royal Development Co., Ltd. v. NLRB,
703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 693-
94 (11th Cir. 1983); Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); NLRB v. Northern
Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
54. 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971).
55. Ben Pekin, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1970).
56. 452 F.2d at 206.
57. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1984).
Alleluia Standard (The "Benefit" Standard)"8
Under the Alleluia standard, if any benefit inures to a group of
employees from an individual's actions, the NLRB will regard the
person's actions as concerted unless there is specific disapproval for
the individual's actions by other employees. The NLRB established
this standard in Alleluia Cushion Co.59
In Alleluia, an employee filed a complaint with California's Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about unsafe
working conditions at his employer's two plants. The individual ac-
companied the OSHA inspector at the inspector's request. After the
inspection the employee was fired. The NLRB held that where an
employee complains and seeks enforcement of a statutory regulation
which relates to occupational safety designed for the benefit of all
employees, it will find implied consent to such action and regard the
activity as concerted unless fellow employees disavow such represen-
tation.60 The NLRB reasoned that the absence of an outward mani-
festation of support by other employees does not mean they reject
the individual's interest in safety or his complaints about safety vio-
lations, emphasizing that "[s]afe working conditions are matters of
great and continuing concern for all in the work force." 61 Occupa-
tional safety is an important condition of employment; its impor-
tance is demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. Activity which invokes rights under this Act
inures to the benefit of other employees because it achieves safe
working conditions. The NLRB presumed that since all employees
have an interest in safe working conditions, they impliedly consent to
the person's actions thereby making the activity concerted. 2
The foundation for Alleluia was laid in G.V.R., Inc.63 There, an
employer required two employees to kick back their wages from pay-
ments on an Army contract. During an investigation of the em-
ployer's failure to file proper payroll records, an Army Compliance
Officer interviewed the employees individually and discovered the
kickback scheme. The Labor Department subsequently initiated pro-
ceedings against the employer who soon afterwards fired both em-
ployees. The NLRB reasoned that an individual who protests the
employer's noncompliance with a federal statute engages in pro-
58. Note, Protection of Individual Action as 'Concerted Activity' Under The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 376, 384 (1983) (due to Alleluia's
presumption of concerted activity for individual activity that benefits fellow employees,
the authors refer to the Alleluia standard as the "Benefit" standard).
59. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1976).
60. Id. at 1000.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 201 N.L.R.B. 147 (1973).
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tected concerted activity for the mutual aid and protection of simi-
larly situated employees.6 4
Although there was group activity in G.V.R., Inc., the NLRB's
reasoning has been applied to individual employee activity. Since
Congress' enactment of a federal statute constitutes a public interest
in a particular area, the assertion of a statutory right may be pre-
sumed to be a matter of concern by all employees for whom it was
enacted. 5 In subsequent decisions, the NLRB expanded Alleluia to
encompass complaints under other federal employment laws and,
eventually, to any complaints which benefited fellow employees. 66
In sum, the above standards define that conduct which constitutes
concerted activity protected under the Act. However, just because an
employee's actions fall under one of these standards does not mean
the Act is violated should the employer fire the individual for such
activity. There is a requirement that the employer know the em-
ployee's activity was concerted.
The Requirement of Employer Knowledge
For an employer's adverse action against an employee to be un-
lawful under the Act, there must be substantial evidence showing (1)
the employee engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mu-
tual aid or protection; and (2) the employer knew of this at the time
of the discharge.67 Thus, an employer does not violate the Act for
discharging an employee for engaging in an activity which the em-
ployer does not know the Act protects. This is so regardless of
whether the employee activity was protected and concerted in the
given instance. 8 While an employee may be discharged for several
different legitimate reasons, an Act violation will be found upon the
64. Id. at 147.
65. Meyers Indus., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1034 (Jan. 6, 1984) (dissenting
opinion).
66. See, e.g., Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Local 28, 252 N.L.R.B. 1124
(1980) (filing a sex discrimination complaint is concerted activity); General Teamsters
Local Union No. 528, 237 N.L.R.B. 258 (1978) (filing a racial discrimination complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is concerted activity); Pink
Moody, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977) (refusing to handle unsafe equipment is con-
certed activity); Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977) (inquiring at employer's
bank whether he has sufficient funds to make the next payroll is concerted activity);
Ambulance Service of New Bedford, 229 N.L.R.B. 106 (1977) (filing a criminal com-
plaint against an employer for continuously dishonored checks is concerted activity);
Dawson Cabinet Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290 (1970) (filing sex discrimination complaint is
concerted activity).
67. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. Air Surrey Corp. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1979).
showing that the dismissal was based, even in part, upon an unlawful
motive. Restraining the exercise of section 7 rights by employees is
an example of such an unlawful motive.69
The requirement that employers know the activity is concerted
adds an interesting twist to the Alleluia decision, since there is im-
plied consent by fellow employees under the Alleluia standard. Due
to this pi'esumption of implied consent, an employer is charged with
the knowledge that an Alleluia-type activity is deemed concerted
and bears the burden of proving otherwise. 70 "
DISPUTE OVER STANDARDS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERTED ACTIVITY
There are two general points of view regarding individual con-
certed activity: the strict and the liberal interpretations. Those
strictly interpreting section 7 find only a limited basis for protecting
individual activity while the liberal interpretation finds a much
broader basis for protecting such activity. A discussion of each of
these viewpoints follows.
Strict Interpretation
Courts which most narrowly construe section 7 define concerted
activity to mean only group activity. Any action by an individual
must be part of or look toward group activity.7' Generally, this view-
point rejects the theory that underlies Interboro and Alleluia as a
legal fiction and recognizes only the "Representation" and Mush-
room standards. 2
Strict interpretation looks to the purpose of the employee's activity
to determine if it is concerted or protected by section 7. If the pur-
pose is for the mutual aid or protection of other employees and not
merely personal, the activity will be regarded as concerted and pro-
tected,'7 3 since group activity seldom exists without someone initiat-
ing it.74
Strict View of Interboro
Courts which reject Interboro feel the doctrine represents an un-
warranted expansion of the definition of concerted activity developed
69. Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 27 (7th Cir. 1980).
70. Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 n.7 (6th Cir. 1980). See
also 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
71. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973).
72. See, e.g., ARO, Inc., v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.
Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971); Mushroom Transp. Co. v.
NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
73. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949)).
74. Owens-Corning Fiberglas v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1968).
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in Mushroom.5 In NLRB v. Northern Metal Company, 6 the third
circuit vehemently rejected Interboro. The court held that Interboro
represented expansion of the Act's coverage in violation of the Act's
clear wording, the doctrine created a legal fiction to support an un-
warranted judicial conception, and such freedom to loosely interpret
the Act was impermissible.77 Basically, the only type of activity the
court felt was concerted was group activity for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or mutual aid or protection.78
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the Interboro doctrine in ARO,
Inc. v. NLRB. 79 The court regarded Interboro as an unwarranted
expansion of the scope of section 7 protection. 0 To be concerted ac-
tivity under the Act, the individual's action cannot be made merely
on an individual's behalf. Rather, the activity must fall within the
coverage of the Mushroom or "Representation" standard.81
Courts reject Interboro in the belief that such a broad standard of
concerted activity hinders the institution of collective bargaining and
destroys industrial peace.8 2 In the courts' view, no real collective bar-
gaining will occur if employers are forced to deal with individual or
splinter groups. 83 They believe that attempted negotiations with indi-
vidual employees makes a mockery of collective bargaining and gen-
erates divisive pressures between employees and employers.84
Strict View of Alleluia
While the NLRB has consistently applied Alleluia to similar
cases, every court of appeals which has examined this standard has
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.
1973).
76. 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971). Here, a probationary employee complained
to his employer that he was entitled to holiday pay under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The employer fired him for making this complaint. The NLRB ruled the em-




79. 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979). In ARO, an employer laid off three temporary
employees due to cutbacks. One employee complained that keeping as a permanent em-
ployee one who was hired after the temporaries were hired violated the seniority provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement. After her complaints, the employer said he
would never recall her. She filed an unfair labor practice charge and the NLRB found
her activity concerted under Interboro.
80. Id. at 718.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Id.
83. NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1964).
84. Id.
rejected it.86 In cases where no collective bargaining agreement is
involved, courts consistently apply either the Mushroom or the
"Representation" standard; both require that an individual must act
with the object of inducing group activity or that the act must relate
to group action in the interest of employees.86
Like those that reject Interboro, courts that reject Alleluia view
the theory of implied concerted activity as a legal fiction. To them,
the theory represents an unwarranted expansion of the definition of
concerted activity which has no statutory support.87
While the NLRB has held that where the subject matter of the
individual's complaint is of common interest the activity inures to
the benefit of other employees, courts have required something more.
The employee must show he intended his activities to relate to or
induce group activity.8  If the employee's activity only demonstrates
a personal grievance, even if the grievance is shared by other em-
ployees, the activity is not concerted. 89 By strict adherence to the
facts in evidence courts have avoided Alleluia 0
Alleluia is regarded as an expansion of Interboro to a nonunion
setting, but courts which have adopted Interboro have nevertheless
rejected Alleluia. In Ontario Knife Company v. NLRB,9' three non-
union employees complained about the excessive workload on their
shift. After speaking with their foreman, one employee walked off
the job. When she reported for work the next day, she was termi-
nated. Although the NLRB found her activity concerted, based on
Alleluia, the Second Circuit held her activity was not protected. The
court stated that section 7 should be read according to its terms ex-
cept in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, as in In-
terboro.9 2 Where there is no collective bargaining agreement, indi-
vidual activity can be protected only if used to induce group activity
85. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 18, at 332.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980).
88. Koch Supplies, Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1981).
89. Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir. 1980).
90. See, e.g., Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980). Here,
an individual employee filed a complaint with Michigan's Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regarding hazardous working conditions. A fellow em-
ployee allowed his name to be used in the complaint. The court held there was no need to
rely on Alleluia to determine whether filing the complaint was a concerted activity in
this case. The facts clearly indicated the activity was protected under section 7 because a
fellow employee signed the complaint which thus constituted group activity under the
Act. See also NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., Inc., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977). Here,
a female employee was discharged for her refusal to work unless she was paid the same
rate as male employees. Prior to this incident, she filed an equal pay complaint with the
Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division. The court held there was no evidence the
employee was fired for filing the pay complaint. The employee's refusal to perform the
work was for her own personal interest, thus making her activity unconcerted.
91. 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 845.
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under the Mushroom standard.93
In his dissent to the NLRB's decision in G.YR. Inc., Chairman
Miller argued for a strict interpretation of the Act to avoid ex-
tending section 7 protection to Alleluia situations. 94 He said the vio-
lation of an employee's rights under another federal statute does not
amount to a violation of rights stemming from the Act and noted
that the law violated in G.VR, Inc. was not the Act.95
In Miller's view the Act does not protect employees against illegal
wage payments, kickbacks, unsafe working conditions, sex discrimi-
nation, or employer retribution against an employee for complaints
to a government agency (other than the NLRB) about the em-
ployer's illegal practices. 96 An individual who files a complaint with
another agency does not accrue rights under the Act.97 Miller
summed up this viewpoint when he said:
Thus, outraged though we may be about the illegal and immoral conduct of
this Respondent, we are neither God nor the Attorney General, and we are
not empowered to correct either all immorality nor all illegality arising
under the total fabric of Federal law.98
Miller believed that where no violation of the Act is established,
the NLRB must dismiss the complaint, no matter how harsh the re-
sult.99 This is the view courts which reject Alleluia seem to adopt.
The discharge of an employee for making a complaint regarding a
statutory violation by the employer will not violate the Act unless the
individual's activity conforms to either the Mushroom or the "Rep-
resentation" standard of individual concerted activity.
Another aspect of Alleluia courts dislike is that the presumption
of concerted activity shifts the burden of proof. The employer must
rebut the presumption that an individual's complaint regarding a
statutory regulation or working condition is a concerted activity with
implied consent by fellow employees.' 00 Courts have noted that the
NLRB fails to suggest the manner in which an employer might ob-
tain evidence to rebut this presumption that other employees endorse
the activity. 10' This presumption becomes, in effect, irrefutable. 10 2
93. Id.
94. G.V.R., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 147, 147 (Miller, Chairman, dissenting).
95. Id.




100. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 309.
102. Id.
Courts which reject Alleluia hold that the burden of proof properly
rests with the NLRB to show the employee was engaged in protected
concerted activity under either the Mushroom or the "Representa-
tion" standard.103
Commentators' Opposition to Alleluia and Interboro
Some commentators argue the paramount purpose of the Act is to
preserve the institution of collective bargaining and achieve indus-
trial peace.104 They believe the Interboro and Alleluia standards for
protection of individual activity misconstrue section 7, go against the
policies of the Act, and reestablish inequity in the labor-management
relationship, thus facilitating industrial strife. 05 Adopting these two
standards encourages individual employees to bypass grievance pro-
cedures and harass employers while constructively relying on a col-
lective bargaining agreement or statutory regulation. 0 6
Critics believe Interboro places individual bargaining on the same
level of importance as collective bargaining. 0 7 They assert that this
result violates the Act's policy of encouraging collective bargaining
to reduce inequity in bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees. 08 Overall, these commentators feel Interboro and Alleluia
ignore the requirements of section 7 and are too tenuous to accept
under the basic policy of the Act.109
Liberal Interpretation
Liberal View of Interboro
Supporters of Interboro believe an individual's invocation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement is an extension of the collective activity
that led to the agreement.110 Judge Biggs, dissenting in NLRB v.
Northern Metal Co.,"' argued that when an individual attempts to
enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, he as-
serts a collective right under a collective contract thereby benefitting
all employees because enforcement of the contract promotes a collec-
tive right." 2
Proponents of Interboro feel the doctrine is a necessary and rea-
103. Id. at 310.
104. E.g., note, supra note 58, at 389.
105. Id. at 390.
106. Id. at 391.
107. E.g., id. at 391-92.
108. E.g., id.
109. E.g., id. at 391.
110. E.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360, 4362 (U.S. Mar.
20, 1984).
111. 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
112. Id. at 887 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
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sonable construction of the Act. A strong supporter of Interboro is
Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit. In his dissent in Illinois Ruan
Transport Corporation v. NLRB113 he said, "[w]here an individual
employee asserts a right found in a collective-bargaining agreement,
it is reasonable to state he is extending the terms protecting union
activity. ' 114 Lay reasoned that both sections 7 and 9(a) 115 of the Act
give an employee the right to act alone when asserting a right consis-
tent with a collective bargaining agreement. He also stated that in
both sections, Congress recognized that an individual's rights are not
totally subsumed by the group when the person asserts rights consis-
tent with the interests of the group. To reason otherwise, according
to Lay, would deny the purpose for which a union exists: to protect
the rights of the individual employee. 116
Liberal View of Alleluia
Judge Lay also supports the Alleluia concept of concerted activity.
He believes that even if no collective bargaining agreement exists, an
employee may still engage in protected concerted activity under sec-
tion 7 if the activity is for the mutual aid or protection of others.117
The enforcement of a statutory regulation meets this requirement
of mutual aid or protection. The NLRB noted in Alleluia that often
the only practical way to enforce statutory regulations is to en-
courage people to report violations. a18 To condone the discharge of
an individual for reporting statutory violations would indicate to
other employees the danger of seeking assistance from federal or
state agencies to obtain statutorily guaranteed working conditions
and would frustrate the purpose of such protective legislation." 9
Judge Lay has observed that employees owe a duty to ensure that
statutory protectibns are enforced. 20 He condemned the discharge of
an employee who took an unsafe truck to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for inspection.' 2 ' Lay argued that performance of a law-
113. 404 F.2d 274, 281 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 285.
115. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) allows an individual employee to present a griev-
ance to his employer without the intervention of the bargaining agent.
116. 404 F.2d at 289 (Lay, J., dissenting).
117. NRLB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, at 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1977)
(Lay, J., dissenting).
118. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1976).
119. Id.
120. Illinois Ruan Transport Co. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 285 (8th Cir. 1968)
(Lay, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 283.
ful duty should not be condemned as unauthorized conduct, that a
driver should never be required to drive an unsafe truck at his and
the public's peril, that the lawful right of a regulatory agency to
inspect unsafe working conditions should supercede a company rule
against unauthorized use of equipment, and finally, that a company
rule which seeks to override a statutory regulation is unreasonable as
a matter of law.12
In subsequent cases, the NLRB expanded Alleluia's protection of
individual activity to any complaint relating to working conditions of
mutual concern to fellow employees. 12 3 Commentators have appro-
priately summed up the expansive basis of Alleluia:
Alleluia Cushion is not only based on the policy of advancing the purpose
of federal and state safety law, but also on the premise that an individual's
actions may be considered to be concerted in nature if they relate to condi-
tions of employment that are matters of mutual concern to all the affected
employees.
12 4
Commentators' Support of Interboro and Alleluia
Commentators who favor Interboro and Alleluia argue that courts
which reject the two doctrines read section 7 too narrowly. They as-
sert that all work-related claims of individual employees should be
protected as concerted activity.' 25 To do otherwise, they reason, de-
nies protection to the individual employee who asserts a collective
right and violates the history and spirit of federal labor laws.120
Their argument is that, while the Act focuses on collective action,
there is no indication in the language of the Act that the term "con-
certed activities" applies only to literal collective action or that Con-
gress intended the term to limit the assertion of employee rights. In-
stead, the term appears to limit only the assertion of individual
rights which are unrelated to collective efforts. 27 In the view of
these commentators, the NLRB must recognize other employment
legislation and construe the Act in a manner supportive of the entire
statutory scheme. Thus, they conclude, presuming concerted activity
in the individual assertion of a statutory right or in a collective bar-
gaining agreement provision inures to the benefit of other employees
and accommodates the Act to the legislative policy regarding work-
ing conditions . 28
122. Id.
123. See supra note 66.
124. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 18, at 306.
125. Id. at 309.
126. E.g., Meyers Indus., 15 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1031 (Jan. 6, 1984) (Zim-
merman, Member, dissenting).
127. Id. at 1033.
128. Id. at 1034.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Supreme Court Approval of Interboro
The Supreme Court recently approved the Interboro Doctrine in
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc.,12 9 where a union truckdriver
refused to drive with faulty brakes. The Court concluded that an
individual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining
agreement was concerted activity and protected under section 7.130
The individual's statement or act must be based on a reasonable and
honest belief that he was asked to perform a task not required under
the collective bargaining agreement. The statement, or act, itself
must be reasonably directed to the enforcement of a collective bar-
gaining agreement right. 31 Concerted activity then exists because
the employee's actions constitute an integral part of the process by
which the agreement is enforced, even if the individual is wrong in
the belief that the collective bargaining agreement right was vio-
lated. So long as the contract is honestly and reasonably invoked,
and the complaint is reasonably clear to the person to whom it is
made, the individual's statement or act will constitute concerted
activity.132
The Supreme Court noted that the disagreement among circuits
over the Interboro doctrine' 33 centers on the relationship that must
exist between an individual's action and group activity under section
7.134 It held the NLRB's view of this relationship was reasonable
because the grant of section 7 protection to an individual employee
by means of Interboro preserves the integrity of the collective bar-
gaining process. An employee, by invoking a right in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, makes that right a reality. The employee's action
revitalizes both the promises in the instant agreement as well as the
collective bargaining process itself, intended by Congress to achieve
129. 52 U.S.L.W. 4360 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984). In this case, a garbage truck driver
refused to drive a truck with faulty brakes. The collective bargaining agreement which
covered the employee guaranteed employees the right to refuse to handle equipment they
in good faith believed was unsafe. After being fired for refusing to drive the truck, the
employee filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The NLRB ruled the
employee's refusal was concerted activity based qn Interboro; however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the NLRB's decision on the basis of ARO, Inc. v.
NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979).
130. Id. at 4362.
131. Id. at 4364.
132. Id. at 4365.
133. Compare text accompanying notes 75-84 supra, with text accompanying
notes 110- 116 supra.
134. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4362.
industrial peace.' 35
The right of employers to control the work environment was not
affected by the Court's approval of Interboro. An employer who ref-
uses to tolerate certain methods by which employees invoke their
rights under the agreement is free to negotiate a contract provision
which limits the availability of such methods. For example, the em-
ployer might insist on a no-strike clause. An employee who violates
such a provision will be unprotected even though the activity may be
concerted. 136
NLRB's Rejection of Alleluia
While the Supreme Court's approval of Interboro was a major vic-
tory for proponents of a liberal interpretation of section 7, the
NLRB handed this group a major defeat in Meyers Industries,
Inc.. 37 The facts in Meyers were similar to those in City Disposal
Systems, except that the case arose in a nonunion setting.
In Meyers, an administrative law judge held that, based on Alle-
luia, the employee's actions were concerted. The NLRB disagreed.
In its decision, the NLRB overruled Alleluia and its progeny, saying
the Alleluia standard of concerted activity failed to reflect the prin-
ciples inherent in section 7. For the NLRB, the standard of con-
certed activity would once again be the objective standard which ex-
isted before Alleluia.138
The NLRB said the language of section 7 showed the Act viewed
concerted action in terms of collective activity such as self organiza-
tion, forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations, and collective
bargaining through representatives. 39
The NLRB criticized the Alleluia standard of concerted activity
as too subjective. Under Alleluia, the NLRB would question
whether the purpose of the activity was one which it wanted to pro-
tect. If so, the NLRB would then find the activity concerted. From
this subjective viewpoint, it mattered not whether the action was in
the form of group activity or individual activity. 40
Prior to Alleluia, the NLRB considered as concerted activity only
135. Id. at 4363.
136. Id. at 4364.
137. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (Jan. 6, 1984). Here, an employee was required
to drive a truck with faulty brakes and steering. Due to a brake malfunction, the em-
ployee had an accident. He informed the Tennessee Department of Transportation about
the accident. An inspector examined the truck and cited the employer for numerous De-
partment of Transportation violations. The employer later fired the employee for report-
ing the accident to the Department of Transportation.
138. Id. at 1028-29. (When the NLRB uses the term "objective" standard in its
Meyers decision, it means activity that falls within either the "Representation" or the
Mushroom standards).
139. Id. at 1026.
140. Id. at 1021.
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the actions of individuals united as a group in pursuit of a common
goal. In Meyers, the NLRB assailed the negative effect Alleluia had
had on the old standard of concerted activity. Under Alleluia the
required demonstration of group will in the workplace was no longer
essential for a finding of concerted activity. The existence of other
employment legislation and its invocation by an individual employee
became sufficient to find the activity concerted.141
Under Alleluia, the NLRB made its own determination of
whether the issue was one which should concern employees as a
group rather than looking for observable evidence of actual group
action. The decisions which followed Alleluia dropped the require-
ment of legislative coverage of the activity. 142 The NLRB instead
decided what was a matter of mutual concern or protection when
there was little or no legislation on the matter. 43 Finally, under Al-
leluia, the burden of proof regarding whether an activity was con-
certed shifted from the NLRB General Counsel to the employer.'
The NLRB in Meyers held that the Act mandates that the old
objective standard be used to determine if activity is concerted. The
NLRB emphasized that while a particular form of individual activ-
ity may warrant group support, this does not, of itself, create a suffi-
cient basis to deem the activity concerted.' 4 For activity to be con-
certed, the employee must be engaged in action with, or under, the
authority of other employees. The action cannot be engaged in solely
by oneself or on one's own behalf.146
To show a violation of the Act after Meyers, the individual must
show that the employer actually knew the individual's activity was
concerted, that the activity was protected by the Act, and that the
employer's adverse action was motivated by the individual's pro-
tected conduct. 147 Accordingly, an employer does not violate the Act
if he mistakenly imposes discipline in a good faith belief that the
employee engaged in misconduct. Thus, if the terms of the Act are
not violated, under the Meyers standard an employer may discharge
an employee for any reason or justification that is not prohibited by
contract or statute.'
4 8
141. Id. at 1027.
142. See supra note 66.
143. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1027.
144. Id. at 1028.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1029.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1029 n.21.
Under the Meyers standard it does not matter that several em-
ployees may individually complain to the employer about the same
matter. The NLRB noted in Meyers that individual employee con-
cern, even if openly manifested by several employees on an individ-
ual basis, is not a sufficient basis for finding concert of action. Some
indication of group activity is necessary for the action to be deemed
concerted. 1
49
While the NLRB specifically overruled Alleluia, it was careful to
maintain Interboro.150 The NLRB factually distinguished Interboro
on the basis that there was an attempted implementation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement in that situation. However, in a nonunion
situation such as Meyers there is no contract to enforce, so the activ-
ity cannot be concerted when an individual complains. 1
In concluding, the NLRB emphasized that section 7 was designed
to legitimate and protect group activity as engaged in by employees
for their own mutual aid or protection. The NLRB acknowledged
that its holding was onerous to the employee in Meyers in view of
the circumstances surrounding the case. However, the NLRB stated
that it was neither God nor the Department of Transportation:
Outraged though we may be by a respondent who - at the expense of its
driver and others traveling on the nation's highways - was clearly attempt-
ing to squeeze the last drop of life out of a trailer that had just as clearly
given up the ghost, we are not empowered to correct all immorality or even
illegality arising under the total fabric of Federal and state laws. 1"'
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
In light of the recent City Disposal Systems and Meyers deci-
sions, the law regarding individual employee activity seems to be in a
state of flux. It would appear that the Supreme Court is expanding
the scope of permissible activity for union employees while the
NLRB is restricting the scope of nonunion employee activity. The
Court seems to give more rights to union employees while the NLRB
is taking away rights it had previously guaranteed employees.
Apparent Inequity Between Union and Nonunion Employee Rights
City Disposal Systems and Meyers involved individual activity.
But while in City Disposal Systems, the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of section 7 with its approval of Interboro, in Meyers the
149. Id. at 1030.
150. Although the NLRB decided Meyers before the Supreme Court decided City
Disposal Systems, the Court's decision has no effect on the validity of the Meyers deci-
sion. The Court stated that the Meyers case was of no relevance in City Disposal Sys-
tems because the NLRB distinguished the case from Interboro. See NLRB v. City Dis-
posal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360, 4362 n.6 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
151. 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1028.
152. Id. at 1031.
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NLRB limited section 7 by shutting the door on almost all individual
activity in a nonunion environment. The two decisions create ineq-
uity between the rights of unionized and nonunionized employees,
especially when work safety is involved, in that unionized employees
have greater protection under the Act.
A union member may rely on safety provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement to improve working conditions. In contrast, a
nonunion employee who files a complaint with a regulatory agency to
improve working conditions is without assurance that the action will
be protected under the Act. This inequity appears even greater when
it is realized that more than half of the workers covered by the Act
are nonunion employees.' 53
Due to the apparent inequity between union and nonunion em-
ployee rights after City Disposal Systems and Meyers, the question
of what constitutes concerted activity to improve working conditions
remains unanswered. Is it the right to go to a regulatory agency or
merely the invocation of a collective bargaining agreement? To de-
termine the answer, it is necessary to examine the rationale underly-
ing Interboro and Alleluia as well as the history and purpose of the
Act.
Rationale For Interboro
There are two bases underlying Interboro. First, the assertion of
collective bargaining agreement rights is an extension of the con-
certed activity that originally produced the agreement. Second, as-
serting these rights affects all employees in the bargaining unit.5
The Supreme Court held Interboro was consistent with the the Act's
purpose of encouraging collective bargaining and other practices fun-
damental to the peaceful adjustment of industrial disputes over
wages, hours, and other working conditions. 55
The key difference between Interboro and Alleluia lies in the basis
of the individual's complaint: does the employee rely on a collective
bargaining agreement or on a public statute? Implementation of a
collective bargaining contract is concerted activity.156 Invocation of a
statutory right (which may cover the same subject as the contract
provision) is not. In Smith v. Evening News Association'57 the Su-
153. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 18, at 287 n.5.
154. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
155. Id. at 4363.
156. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
157. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
preme Court said:
The right of individual employees concerning rates of pay and conditions of
employment are a major focus of negotiation and administration of collec-
tive bargaining contracts. Individual claims which lie at the heart of the
grievance and arbitration machinery, are to a large degree inevitably inter-
twined with union interests and many times precipitate grave questions con-
cerning the interpretation and enforceability of collective bargaining con-
tracts on which they are based.'58
Thus it is that such individual claims, lying at the heart of the griev-
ance and arbitration machinery, are defined as concerted acts.
Rationale For Alleluia
Under Alleluia, an employee's assertion of an employment-related
statutory right was presumed to be activity protected by the Act. An
individual employee who filed an employment-related complaint with
a federal or state agency was viewed as engaging in activity which
furthered fellow employee's rights under the relevant statute. 5 To
presume without evidence that fellow employees did not endorse an
individual's effort to enforce a statutory regulation for their benefit
was seen as contrary to the policy underlying the employment legis-
lation relied on by the individual. Therefore, unless fellow employees
did object to such action, there was a presumption of concerted ac-
tivity. Since laws which protect the well-being of employees had
been legislatively declared to be in the overall public interest, con-
certed activity and employee consent was seen to emanate from the
individual's assertion of statutory rights.160
Those favoring Alleluia argue that the presumption of concerted
activity in asserting a statutory right is consistent with the legislative
history of section 7, supports the policies of the Act, and fulfills the
NLRB's responsibility to accommodate the Act to other employment
legislation. 161 They agree that the main purpose of the Act is to en-
courage the normal flow of commerce by avoiding or minimizing in-
dustrial strife. 6 2 Evidence of such intent is found in section 1(b) of
the Labor Management Relations Act 63 which asserts that the pur-
pose of the Act may be achieved if employers, employees, and labor
158. Id. at 200.
159. Meyers Indus., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1032 (Jan. 6, 1984) (Zimmer-
man, Member, dissenting); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1976).
160. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
161. E.g., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). Al-
though the NLRB overruled Alleluia, proponents for the standard continue to assert its
validity. Because changes in the Presidency of the United States often bring about
changes in the NLRB's perception of the appropriate labor policy, Alleluia-type situa-
tions will come before the NLRB again. Whether the NLRB readopts Alleluia or contin-
ues to reject it will depend on the political party in office and the labor policy of the
President.
162. Id.
163. Labor Management Relations Act § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982).
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organizations recognize the legal rights of one another in their rela-
tionships, and refrain from activities which jeopardize the public
health, safety, or interest.
Proponents point out the presumption of concerted activity is sup-
ported by the NLRB's policies and its duty to accommodate other
employment legislation. The Act considers employee concern for
matters affecting the public health, safety, or interest - matters not
limited to the Act, but embodied in numerous other employment-
related legislation.16 4 The NLRB in Alleluia noted that the Supreme
Court told it to recognize the purposes and policies of other employ-
ment legislation and to construe the Act in a manner supportive of
the overall statutory scheme.165 The Court emphasized this point in
Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB16 6 when it said:
The NLRB has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act so single mindedly that it may wholly ignore
other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently, the entire
scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one stat-
utory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an adminis-
trative body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive em-
phasis upon its immediate task.1
67
Thus, Alleluia proponents reason that the presumption of concerted
activity accommodates the Act's overall legislative policy regarding
the workplace and working conditions.
Emporium Capwell: Supreme Court's View of the Legislative
History and Purpose of The Act
The Supreme Court weakened the thrust of Southern Steamship
in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organi-
zation. 68 In Emporium, a group of minority employees filed a griev-
ance through their union alleging racial discrimination. Then, claim-
ing the grievance procedure was inadequate, they demanded to meet
with the company president. Upon the president's refusal to meet
with them, they picketed the employer's store in violation of the no-
strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. They were fired
after repeated warnings to stop both picketing and encouraging a
consumer boycott.
164. 115 L.R.R.M. at 1304 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
165. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (citing Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S.
31, 47 (1942)).
166. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
167. Id. at 47.
168. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
The Court noted that it must construe the Act in light of the
broad national policy of nondiscrimination in employment. 169 It held,
however, that even if an employee discharge violated the Civil
Rights Act,170 it did not necessarily follow that the discharge also
violated the Act. m1
The Court followed a strict interpretation of section 7. Since the
activity here subverted the collective bargaining process, the Court
implied that the purpose of the Act is to promote industrial stability
through collective bargaining. Whether or not the employees' sub-
stantive right to be free from racial discrimination is found under
Title VII 72 or finds an independent basis in the Act, they cannot
pursue such rights at the expense of the orderly collective bargaining
process contemplated by the Act.' 73 The Court stated that under the
Act, concerted activities are protected not for their own sake, but as
an instrument of a national labor policy to minimize industrial strife
through collective bargaining. 174
The Court noted in City Disposal Systems that activities which
lead to the practice of collective bargaining are protected under the
Act. The Court found that Congress intended to create equality in
bargaining power between the employee and employer throughout
the entire process of labor organization, collective bargaining, and
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 1,
Congress never intended to increase disharmony between em-
ployee and employer by protecting individual activity such as report-
ing an employer for statutory violations. The Act's goal is to bring
the parties together for the purpose of collective bargaining and the
preservation of industrial peace.
The Court found in Emporium that invoking a statutory right pro-
tected under other employment legislation does not mean that the
same activity is entitled to protection under the Act.7 Conduct
which does not meet the present criteria for concerted activity may
form the basis for a lawful discharge. 77 Therefore, if an individual
wishes to invoke a statutory right and be protected under the Act,
the activity must conform either to the "Representation" or the
Mushroom standard. 78
169. Id. at 66.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(e)(17) (1982).
171. Id. at 71.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(3) (1982).
173. Id. at 69.
174. Id. at 62.
175. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360, 4363 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1984).
176. 420 U.S. at 71.
177. Id.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
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While under the Act an individual employee who invokes a statu-
tory right may be discharged, most employment-related statutes pro-
vide for recourse against an employer who fires an employee for in-
voking a statutory right under such statute. 17 9 The statute usually
provides that the employee may be reinstated with back pay.
180
Often, the process of reinstatement after invoking a statute will take
longer and involve more risks with some regulatory agencies than
would be the case with the NLRB, because the NLRB may issue an
administrative order while some agencies are not empowered to do
SO.181
Proponents of Alleluia are quick to note that not all employment-
related statutes protect an employee against employer retaliation. An
individual is not protected against an employer's wrath when assert-
ing rights under wage and hour laws, workmen's compensation laws,
and many state employment laws. While Alleluia supporters admit
the preservation of collective bargaining and industrial peace is the
paramount policy of the Act, they claim that, under Meyers, the
NLRB ignores the mutual aid or protection clause of section 7 when
it denies concerted activity status to an individual's complaint under
a work-related statute. 82
The NLRB, however, does not ignore this clause. Under Meyers,
group activity for the mutual aid or protection of fellow employees is
deemed to be concerted and thus protected.8 3 This viewpoint is sup-
ported by the Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB. 84 In Eastex,
an employer refused to allow the bargaining representative to dis-
tribute a union newsletter encouraging political action by the em-
ployees. The employer felt any activity not dealing with the em-
ployee-employer relationship was unprotected under the section 7
mutual aid or protection clause. The Court held the mutual aid or
protection clause protects employees from employer retaliation when
179. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e)(3) (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act §§ 15(a)(3), 16(b), 29 U.S.C. §§
215(a)(1), 216(b) (1982); Discrimination Against Employees Exercising Rights Under-
neath The William-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 C.F.R. §§
1977.1-1977.23 (1982).
180. See, e.g., statute sections cited supra note 179.
181. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
71 (1975). For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cannot issue
an administrative order requiring an employer to reinstate an employee that he fired for
filing a Title VII charge. Instead it must bring suit against the employer in federal court
to try to require the employer to reinstate the employee.
182. 115 L.R.R.M. at 1032 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
183. 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
184. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
they attempt to improve working conditions by resort to administra-
tive, judicial, or legislative forums.185 Not protecting such concerted
activity would violate another purpose of the Act: the right of em-
ployees to act together to improve working conditions. 18
Alleluia proponents will find no basis of support in Eastex for pro-
tecting individual activity since the Court did not refer to individual
activity in its opinion. The Eastex language demonstrates that there
must be group activity because the Court refers to employees only in
a plural sense. The requirement of group activity was reinforced by
the Court when it said the NLRB is responsible for establishing the
boundaries of the mutual aid or protection clause by means of the
cases coming before it. 87 The NLRB reversed its original position in
Alleluia and established this boundary in Meyers when it held that
to be concerted, activity for mutual aid or protection must be group
activity or activity which attempts to induce group activity. 88
CONCLUSION
Congress never intended to increase disharmony between em-
ployee and employer by protecting under the Act individual activity
such as reporting an employer for statutory violations. The goal of
the Act is to bring the parties together to resolve problems. If an
individual wishes to invoke a statutory right and be protected under
the Act, the activity must conform either to the "Representation" or
the Mushroom standard.
While the individual who asserts an employment-related statutory
right is without Act protection, denial of such protection preserves
the institution of collective bargaining. To afford protection for an
individual's assertion of a statutory right would be drastic in the case
of unionized employees represented by a bargaining agent. If indi-
viduals were allowed to invoke statutory rights whenever they were
displeased with their work situation, they would undermine the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the role of the bargaining repre-
sentative. Advocates of minority viewpoints could subvert the collec-
tive bargaining and grievance process by trying to get a regulatory
agency to enforce their wishes. Even Judge Lay, in Northern Metal,
conceded that if individual activity were protected, employees would
be encouraged to bypass the regular grievance procedure. 18 Sub-
verting the grievance process would increase fractionization among
185. Id. at 565-66.
186. Id. at 567 (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14
(1962)).
187. Id. at 568.
188. 115 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
189. NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 888 (3d Cir. 1971) (Lay, J.,
dissenting).
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membership of the bargaining unit and force the employer to bar-
gain with several different factions. Consequently, industrial strife
would increase the burdens or obstructions of commerce, and the
employer's ability to manage the employees and confrol the work
environment would be hindered.
The Act's purpose is not to guarantee employees the right to act
as they please; rather, its objective is to guarantee them the right of
collective bargaining in order to preserve industrial peace. 190 An em-
ployer must have some right to maintain control over the workforce
to keep commerce flowing. Nothing in the language or legislative
history of the Act demonstrates a Congressional intent to intrude
upon the day-to-day operation of an employer's business.' 9 ' An em-
ployer has the right to hire or fire any employee at will unless lim-
ited by contract or statute. 92 Thus, if an employer never attempts to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under the
Act, an employer may fire an employee whose actions he resents. 93
While this is a harsh result, industrial peace must be preserved.
Granted, problems exist with the present state of the law. Not pro-
tecting the individual invocation of a statutory right creates a disin-
centive to invoke these rights. The effect defeats the purpose of em-
ployment-related legislation and is a disservice to the public interest.
A further side effect is that the employee is forced to make sophis-
ticated legal judgments before attempting to invoke a statutory
right. To be protected, the employee must try to engage in group
activity, or best of all, get all the employees to complain together in
writing. This represents a difficult obstacle for an individual. Conse-
quently, an employee may hesitate to assert a statutory right if he
cannot easily interest a group of fellow employees to act with him.
While the enforcement of statutory rights is a desirable end, the
present language of the Act does not give the judiciary or the NLRB
the basis to protect such individual activity. Since individuals who
enforce statutory regulations promote the public interest, Congress
and the state legislatures should amend either the Act or the other
respective employment legislation to protect such activity.
PATRICK J. DUFFY
190. Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949).
191. ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979).
192. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
193. Id.

